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Note

Section 1988: An Alternative
to Vicarious Liability Under
the Civil Rights Act of 1871
Gronquist v. Gilster,No. CV77-L-3 (D. Neb. Nov. 16,
1978).
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 19831 provides a federal remedy for individuals deprived of their civil rights by persons acting under color of state
law.2 In Sebastion v. United States,3 the Eighth Circuit held the
doctrine of respondeat superior 4 "inapplicable to an action for deprivation of civil rights." 5 Although numerous authorities support
the Sebastion decision, 6 exceptions to the general rule have been
created. 7 In Gronquist v. Gilster,8 plaintiff's motion for a new trial
1. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976)) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom of usage, or any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
2. Id.
3. 531 F.2d 900 (8th Cir. 1976).
4. The common law doctrine of vicarious liability holds A liable for B's negligent acts because of a certain relationship between A and B. Respondeat
superior refers to the master-servant relationship. However, the terms are
often used interchangeably. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF
TORTs § 69, at 458-59 (4th ed. 1971).
5. 531 F.2d at 904.
6. See generally Cotton v. Hutto, 577 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1978); Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1974); Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir.
1973); Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971); Knipp v. Weikle, 405 F.
Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Moore v. Buckles, 404 F. Supp. 1382 (E.D. Tenn.
1975); Townes v. Swenson, 349 F. Supp. 1246 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
7. See Baskin v. Parker, 588 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1979); Taylor v. Gibson, 529 F.2d
709 (5th Cir. 1976); Tuley v. Heyd, 482 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1973); Scott v.
Vandiver, 476 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1973); Hesselgesser v. Reilly, 440 F.2d 901 (9th
Cir. 1971); Campise v. Hamilton, 382 F. Supp. 172 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Lucas v.
Kale, 364 F. Supp. 1345 (W.D. Va. 1973); Salinas v. Flores, 359 F. Supp. 233
(S.D. Tex. 1973).
8. No. CV77-L-3 (D. Neb. Nov. 16, 1978).

1156

1979]

SECTION 1988 VICARIOUS LIABILITY

1157

based on the court's failure to instruct the jury on vicarious liability was denied by the appellate court. This note will analyze Gronquist to determine whether it should fall within an exception to
the Sebastion holding. In addition, two alternative causes of action
will be suggested which might lead to recovery under similar factual circumstances.
II.
A.

THE GRONQUIST DECISION

The Facts

The plaintiff brought an action against the Sheriff of Lincoln
County, Nebraska, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint alleged that while plaintiff was confined in the Lincoln County jail he
informed the sheriff and other county personnel of his diabetic
condition. It alleged that the plaintiff was denied adequate medical care, resulting in physical harm;. that he was threatened and
beaten while confined; and that these actions violated his eighth
amendment rights. 9 The evidence, "viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff established that Gronquist was confined
in the Lincoln County jail; that he asked Gilster's deputies for
medical treatment; that the medical treatment was not rendered
until Sheriff Gilster became aware personally of Gronquist's condition; and that Gilster immediately upon learning of the situation
arranged for medical care."' 0
The jury was instructed that only the acts or omissions of the
sheriff could result in his liability. After the jury found for defendant, plaintiff moved for a new trial, claiming" 'that the court erred
in failing to instruct the jury on liability based upon the theory of
respondeat superior.""'
B.

Plaintiff's Contention

Plaintiff found support for his motion under a Nebraska statute 12 which holds a sheriff responsible for the acts of his deputy.
In addition, the plaintiff relied on Hesselgesser v. Reilly,'3 a Ninth
Circuit decision which held a sheriff liable for his deputy's acts
under section 1983 when state law authorized such liability:
9.
10.
11.
12.

No. CV77-L-3, slip op. at 1.
Id.
Id.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-801 (Reissue 1976) provides: "State and County officers;
deputies. The Auditor of Public Accounts, State Treasurer, and State Librarian respectively, and each county register of deeds, treasurer, sheriff, clerk,
and surveyor, may appoint a deputy, for whose acts he shall be responsible,
and from whom he shall require a bond. ..
13. 440 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1971).
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[P]laintiff's claim against these defendants is based upon Washington
statutes which establish the authority and duties of sheriffs and deputy
sheriffs and provide that sheriffs shall be liable for the negligence "and
misconduct" of their jailors and other deputies....
The Civil Rights Act does not itself specifically establish a basis for liability, vicarious or otherwise, against persons who do not participate in a
civil right violation.... Thus if one who did not participate in such violation is to be held liable for the civil rights violation of another on principles of vicarious liability, or by reason of statutory responsibility, it must
be because: (1) the Civil Rights Act gives recognition to the laws of the
states pertaining to such liability and, (2) the
laws of the particularstate
14
where the action arose create such liability.

By holding the sheriff liable for the conduct of his deputy, the Hesselgesser court determined that both of these tests had been satisfied.' 5
C.

The Court's Rejection

In refusing to follow the Hesselgesser interpretation of section
1988 in Gronquist, the court relied primarily upon two Supreme
Court cases: Moor v. County of Alameda,16 and Monell v. Department of Social Services,'7 neither of which is persuasive as applied
to the facts in Gronquist.
In Moor, plaintiffs brought suit against the county under sections 1983 and 1988 for violation of their civil rights by a deputy
sheriff.18 Their claim was that under the California Tort Claims
Act 19 the county was vicariously liable for the acts of the sheriff
14. Id. at 902-03 (emphasis added).
15. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1976)) provides:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions of this Title, and of Title 'CIVIL
RIGHTS,'. . . shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the
laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry
same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the
object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable
remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State
wherein the court having jurisdiction ... is held, so far as the same
is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial
and disposition of the cause ....
16. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
17. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
18. On these facts, the plaintiffs could have possibly asserted a direct cause of
action against the county for a fourteenth amendment violation. See notes
36-54 & accompanying text infra.
19. CAl. Gov'T CODE § 815.2(a) (West 1966) provides: "A public entity is liable
for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the
public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would,
apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative."

1979]

SECTION 1988 VICARIOUS LIABILITY

1159

and his deputies committed in violation of the plaintiffs' civil
rights. Plaintiffs alleged that section 1983 was not "fully 'adapted'
to the protection of federal civil rights or [was] 'deficient in the
provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies' within the
meaning of § 1988."20
In considering the proper role of section 1988 in federal civil
rights litigation, the Court concluded that it was not intended "to
authorize the federal courts to borrow entire causes of action from
state law."2 1 It reasoned that section 1988 was not an independent
act of Congress within the jurisdiction-conferring statute,22 and
therefore, was only to instruct federal courts as to the source of
law to apply.2 3 In addition, it considered its decision in Monroe v.
Pape,24 which held that municipalities were not "persons" subject
to section 1983 actions, 25 and concluded that to hold the county liable under section 1988 would be "inconsistent
with the Constitu'26
tion and laws of the United States.
The plaintiffs in Moor relied upon Hesselgesser as authority for
their cause of action, but the Court noted an important distinction:
In Hesselgesser the Court of Appeals ruled that a sheriff could be held
vicariously liable in damages for the wrongful act of his deputy which deprived a prisoner of his civil rights where state law provided for such vicarious liability. The court.. . found authority for incorporation of state law
into federal law in § 1988, but it was acting in the context of a suit brought
against the sheriff on the basis of § 1983 ...
These decisions simply do
not support the suggestion that § 1988 alone
authorizes the creation of a
27
federal cause of action against the County.

D.

Analysis

Gronquist was in the context of a section 1983 action against a
sheriff. Accordingly, it cannot be distinguished from Hesselgesser,
which was left undisturbed by the Court's opinion in Moor.28 A
20. 411 U.S. at 700.
21. Id. at 702.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1976):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:

23.
24.

25.
26.
27.
28.

(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief
under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights,
including the right to vote.
411 U.S. at 705.
365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part,Monell v. Department of Social Serv.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monroe was overruled only to the extent it granted local
governmental units total immunity from section 1983 liability.
365 U.S. at 191.
411 U.S. at 706.
Id. at 704 n.17 (emphasis added).
But see Knipp v. Weikle, 405 F. Supp. 782, 785 n.4 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
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closer reading of Moor would indicate that when an independent
basis for subject matter jurisdiction exists in a section 1983 action,
section 1988 may
be used to apply state law on the question of stat29
utory liability.
The second reason relied upon in Moor to discount plaintiff's
section 1988 claim-that it was inconsistent with its previous holding in Monroe-must be analyzed in light of Monell v. Department
of Social Services,30 which overruled Monroe in relevant part:
"Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of
1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units to be included among those
persons to whom § 1983 applies." 3 1 Thus, a local government may
be liable when "the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional
implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation
or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers" as well when "deprivations are visited pursuant to governmental 'custom.'- 32 However, the Court expressly rejected the
issue of vicarious liability of a local government-an a section 1983
action: "[W] e conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable
solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeatsupe'33
rior theory.
Liability in Gronquist was not based upon a respondeat superior theory, but upon sections 1983 and 1988, which authorize federal courts to look to state law in certain circumstances. 3 4 In view
of the fact that an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction
exists in Gronquist,a proper resolution of the liability issue would
be to apply section 1988 to determine whether state law may be
invoked on the issue of statutory liability.
29. The ultimate issue then becomes whether an independent basis of subject
matter jurisdiction exists in a section 1983 action without personal involvement on part of the sheriff. Hesselgesser answers the question affirmatively.
30. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
31. Id. at 690 (emphasis in original).
32. Id. at 690-91.
33. Id. at 691.
34. One commentator has suggested a three-part test before section 1988 may be
invoked: "First, the federal act must be deficient in furnishing a remedy for
the vindication of plaintiff's civil rights. Second, there must be an adequate
state remedy available. Third, the state remedy must not be inconsistent
with federal law." Note, CrviL RIGHTs-Municipalitiesas Parties-Waiverof
Sovereign Immunity by a State does not Give a Federal Cause of Action for
Damages Under Sections 1983 and 1988 of the Civil Rights Act, 2 FoRDHAM
URB. L. J. .109, 114 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
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MII. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF LIABILITY
A.

Direct Action Against the County for Violation of a Fourteenth
Amendment Right

Because individual defendants may often be judgment-proof 35
and Monell v. Departmentof Social Services3 6 prohibits municipal
liability under section 1983 on a vicarious liability theory, deserving plaintiffs may be forced to pursue other remedies in order to
receive adequate compensation. Many commentators 37 have advocated methods to circumvent Monroe.38 Since Monell overruled
Monroe only to a limited extent,3 9 these alternatives remain viable
when individuals are precluded from bringing suit on a vicarious
liability theory.
The Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,4°
held that federal officers could be sued for damages as a result of
the deprivation of a person's fourth amendment rights. 41 Since
section 1983 is available only against those persons acting under
color of state law,42 no statutory remedy existed for the deprivation
of civil rights by federal officers. The Court found that the United
States Constitution created the remedy and that jurisdiction in
federal courts existed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). 43
35. A defendant is judgment-proof if he owns insufficient assets in order to satisfy the judgment at an execution sale. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1552 (Reissue 1978) which provides that "[all heads of families ... shall have exempt
from forced sale on execution the sum of fifteen hundred dollars in personal
property."
36. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See notes 30-33 & accompanying text supra.
37. See generally Handt, Suing Municipalities Directly Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 70 Nw. U. L REv. 770 (1976); Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public
Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL L. REV. 131
(1971); Comment, Section 1983, the Eleventh Amendmen and General Principles of Tort Immunities and Defenses: Who Is Left To Sue?, 45 U.M.K.C. L.
REv. 29 (1976); Note, 2 FoRDAm URB. L. J., supranote 34,Note, A Municipality
Is a "Person" Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Where Local Law Has Abolished Sovereign Immunity, 9 Hous. L. REV. 587 (1972); Note, Developing Governmental
Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 55 MNN.I REV. 1201 (1971).
38. See notes 24-26 & accompanying text supra.
39. A municipal corporation may be sued when it deprives an individual of his
civil rights when it has acted through official policy or by custom with the
force of law. Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
40. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
41. Id. at 397.
42. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973) (section 1983 was not
available as a cause of action against the District of Columbia).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976) provides in relevant part: "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000... and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. . . ." Plaintiff sought damages of
$15,000 from each of the six defendants.
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Bivens has been used as a springboard to avoid the section 1983
limitation of Monroe as a basis for suit against non-persons for a
violation of fourteenth amendment rights.44 This rationale has
been fortified by Justice Brennan's concurrence in City of Kenosha
v. Bruno,4 5 which involved an action against a municipality for violation of the plaintiff's fourteenth amendment procedural due
process rights:
Appellees did assert 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as an alternative ground of jurisdiction, but I agree with the Court's conclusion that existence of the requisite
amount in controversy is not, on this record, clearly established. If appellees can prove their allegationthat at least $10,000 is in controversy, then
46
§ 1331 jurisdictionis available ... and they are clearly entitled to relief.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently held that a
discharged chief of police could bring an action for money damages against his municipal employer after he was discharged without procedural due process. 47 The court noted that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331(a) conferred jurisdiction since the amount in controversy
exceeded $10,000.48 On appeal, the defendant claimed that it was
not amenable to suit under this theory.49 In rejecting the defendant's argument, the court relied primarily upon Bivens and City of
Kenosha to sustain the cause of action.50
It should be noted that an action of this type involves two basic
assumptions: first, that a direct action does exist on a fourteenth
amendment theory; and second, that the doctrine of respondeat
superior 5 ' would impose liability upon the municipal employer.
However, after City of Kenosha, the first assumption is at least an
open question. 52 With respect to the second assumption, the question is whether or not there is any special reason for exempting
municipal employers from the respondeat superior doctrine.
Municipalities function in the role of employer to the same ex44. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Collum v. Yurkovich, 409 F.
Supp. 557 (N.D. Ill.
1975); Brown v. Board of Educ., 386 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ill.
1974).
45. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
46. Id. at 516 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
47. Owen v. City of Independence, Missouri, 560 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1977).
48. The $10,000 amount in controversy requirement may seriously impede a
cause of action under this theory. One argument which has been advanced is
that in eliminating the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement in 28
U.S.C. § 1343(4), Congress has implicitly declared that a violation of a person's constitutional rights is per se worth more than $10,000. See CCCOWestern Region v. Fellows, 359 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Ca. 1972) which noted that
"fundamental constitutional rights are 'almost by definition, worth more than
$10,000.'" Id. at 647.
49. 560 F.2d at 927.
50. Id. at 933.
51. See note 4 supra.
52. The Supreme Court has not addressed this issue.
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tent as do private enterprises. In view of the fact that deprivations
53
of civil rights have been characterized as constitutional torts, it
seems logical to apply the tort doctrine of respondeat superior.
The same policy considerations of finding a responsible defendant
54
in a position to absorb the loss on a cost of doing business theory
are also applicable in the context involving a municipal employer.
In effect, the taxpayers will be paying the judgment, but arguably,
this should only serve to promote the hiring and electing of responsible municipal officials.
B.

Section 1983 Action Against the Deputy and a Pendent State Claim
Against the Sheriff

Lower federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction for several reasons. First, their
jurisdiction is limited to an Article III,
"case or controversy."5 5 Second, they cannot act unless Congress
has by statute vested them with jurisdiction. 56 However, the judicially-created doctrine of pendent jurisdiction 7 has allowed a
plaintiff to join a state law claim over which no independent basis
of subject matter jurisdiction exists, with a federal claim. The
courts have justified the traditional notion by exercising jurisdiction over claims to which Congress has not expressly granted jurisdiction, on the dual notions of judicial economy and convenience
to the litigants. 58
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction was given an expansive interpretation in UMW v. Gibbs.5 9 In this instance, plaintiff joined a
state tort action for interference with contract with a federal claim
under section 303 of the National Labor Management Relations
Act.6 0 The Court looked only to the Constitution for limitations on
the exercise of jurisdiction over the state claim: "Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there is a
claim 'arising under [the] Constitution. . .' and the relationship
between that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that
53. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 556-57 (1967).
54. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 459.
55. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2: '"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties ......
56. 'The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish." U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1.
57. See Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiciton, 81 HAav. L Rav. 657
(1968).
58. See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
59. Id.
60. Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, § 303, 61 Stat. 158, (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 187(a)
(1976)).
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the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional
'case.' "61 The Court went on to define a proper Article I case:
The federal claim must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter
The state and federal claims must derive
jurisdiction on the court ....
from a common nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiffs claims are such that he
would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding,
the federal issues, there is power in fedthen, assuming substantiality 6of
2
eral courts to hear the whole.

Gibbs did not involve the addition of a party in the state claim
over which no independent ground of subject matter jurisdiction
existed. The issue of pendent party63 jurisdiction, expressly left
open in Moor v. County ofAlameda,6 4 was finally addressed in Aldinger v. Howard,65 where plaintiff attempted to join her section
1983 claim against county officials with a state claim against the
county under a statute that authorized liability for tortious conduct of county officials. The facts arguably satisfied the Gibbs test
of substantiality and relatedness. 6 6 However, the Aldinger Court
refused to recognize pendent party claims involving only civil
rights litigants: "[W] e decide here only the issue of so-called 'pendent party' jurisdiction with respect to a claim brought under
§§ 1343(3) and 1983. Other statutory grants and other 67alignments
of parties and claims might call for a different result."
To reach this result the Court focused not on Article II as in
Gibbs, but on the statutory grant of jurisdiction in section 1983 actions:
[W] e think a fair reading of the language used in § 1343, together with the
scope of § 1983, requires a holding that the joinder of a municipal corporation, like the county here, for purposes of asserting a state-law claim not
within federal diversity
jurisdiction, is without the statutory jurisdiction of
68
the district court.

The test adopted in Aldinger is that before pendent party jurisdiction may be invoked "a federal court must satisfy itself not only
that Art. 1mI permits it, but that Congress in the statutes conferring
jurisdiction has not expressly or by implication negated its exist61. 383 U.S. at 725 (emphasis & brackets in original).
62. Id. (emphasis in original).
63. The pendent party is one not a party to the federal jurisdiction-conferring
claim. For a discussion of the evolution of pendent jurisdiction, see Comment, Aldinger v. Howard and Pendent Jurisdiction,77 COLUM. L REV. 127
(1977).
64. 411 U.S. 693, 715 (1973). Plaintiffs in Moor asserted a pendent state claim
against the county based on state statute. See notes 16-27 & accompanying
text supra.
65. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
66. 383 U.S. at 725.
67. 427 U.S. at 180.
68. Id. at 17.
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ence. ' '69 Although the Court did not define "negation," it did note
that counties were excluded from section 1983 liability.70 As a result, it refused to permit section 1343(3) to invoke federal jurisdiction merely because the facts also gave rise to a state action. 71
The reasoning of Aldinger must be questioned since Monell v.
Department of Social Services72 now authorizes municipal liability
in section 1983 actions. Arguably that would destroy the implicit
congressional negation found in section 1343(3). Moreover, the
opinion fails to look at the policies behind the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction.7 3 The effect of Aldinger is to force a plaintiff wishing
to adjudicate in one suit a section 1983 claim and a factually-related state claim, to sue only in state court. In view of the fact that
section 1983 was enacted to provide a federal remedy,7 4 it seems
only reasonable that pendent jurisdiction should be available in a
section 1983 action even in a pendent party context.
The viability of a section 1983 action against a deputy and a pendent party claim under Nebraska law7 5 against the sheriff, remains
questionable at best after Aldinger.76 The only basis for distinction is that Aldinger involved a pendent party claim against the
county rather than the sheriff individually. An implicit negation in
the jurisdiction-conferring statute would be more difficult to discern when the pendent party suit is against an individual. In addition, since Monel17 7 now recognizes a section 1983 action against a
county, the reasoning in Aldinger is so seriously undermined that
its precedential authority is questionable.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Monell v. Department of So69. Id. at 18.
70. This assertion is no longer true after Monell. See notes 30-33 &accompanying
text supra.
71. 427 U.S. at 17.
72. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See notes 30-33 &accompanying text supra.
73. See note 57 & accompanying text supra.
74. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,242 (1972) ('The very purpose of § 1983 was to
interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians
of the people's federal rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law.") Id. at 242.
75. See note 12 supra.
76. After Monroe, there was uncertainty as to whether recovery ina state action
precluded section 1983 recovery in federal court on collateral estoppel principles. However, the courts were seeking to protect two separate interests. See
Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,396 U.S. 901 (1969), where
the court recognized a pendent claim for false imprisonment under state law
in addition to his section 1983 action. However, the probable effect on damages would be a split between the two causes of action rather than an overall
increase.
77. See notes 30-33 &accompanying text supra.
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cial Services,78 was long overdue in overruling Monroe v. Pape.79
However, by rejecting liability based upon a vicarious liability theory, many section 1983 plaintiffs will still be unable to recover from
municipal employers. Where permissible under state law, section
1988 offers a viable alternative to impose liability upon defendants
not participating in the deprivation of civil rights.
8l
80
In addition to the Ninth Circuit, both the Fourth and Fifth82
Circuits have properly held that section 1988 permits state law, in
section 1983 actions, to impose liability on a sheriff not participating in a civil rights deprivation. The Eighth Circuit's decision in
Sebastion v. United States8 3 that vicarious liability was inapplicable in a section 1983 action did not involve section 1988 and therefore is consistent with Monell. However, liability in a section 1983
action with reference to state law, as authorized by section 1988, is
not based on the common law doctrine of vicarious liability and
courts should recognize the distinction.
James E. Papik '80

78. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
79. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part,Monell v. Department of Social Serv.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
80. Hesselgesser v. Reilly, 440 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1971).
81. Scott v. Vandiver, 476 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1973). The court held a sheriff liable
for the assault committed by two county employees acting in accordance with
the sheriff's request. It distinguished vicarious liability in a section 1983 action from invoking state law to determine the extent of a sheriffs liability as
authorized by section 1988.
82. Baskin v. Parker, 588 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1979). The court held that the action
against the sheriff should not have been dismissed since the sheriff's liability
for acts of his deputies was controlled by state law. However, it failed to note
the distinction between vicarious liability in a section 1983 action and section
1988 authorizing state law to determine the extent of liability.
83. 531 F.2d 900 (8th Cir. 1976).

